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Abstract: This paper provides a systematic welfare-based approach to analyze the
impact of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on trade and welfare in the presence of
market imperfections. It focuses on standard-like measures such as technical
barriers and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. The approach overcomes the
shortcomings of the mainstream approach based on the analysis of foregone trade
caused by trade costs. The latter ignores market imperfections, and welfare is
found to increases when NTMs are reduced and trade expands. We explain how
to account for external effects and market failures in trade-focused welfare
analysis, leading to a more balanced overall assessment of measures despite a
potential reduction of trade ﬂows. The relationships between trade, welfare, and
NTMs are complex, and generalizations are best avoided. Very often, the optimum
NTM is not the absence of regulation. An application to shrimp trade illustrates
the feasibility of the proposed approach. The illustration shows that
the reinforcement of a food safety standard can be socially preferable to the
status-quo situation, both domestically and internationally.
1. Introduction
Regulations in the food and agriculture sectors abound. In many cases, they are
put in place and enforced by governments in order to address societal interests
where unregulated markets are not yielding the desired outcome. In some other
cases, these measures may be motivated by protectionism or outdated science.
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Nevertheless, external effects and information asymmetries abound and require
intervention, and this paper focuses on those cases.
Many of the regulations address human health issues; others address environ-
mental and animal welfare problems associated with agricultural production. As
long as the regulation concerns a non-tradable good (or service), the optimal design
of the regulatory measures need not take the interest of foreign parties into account.
But non-tradability is the exception rather than the rule and border measures and
behind-the-border measures are usually taken to assure that the imported varieties
meet domestic requirements. Hence, trade ﬂows may be affected by these regu-
lations. Research on non-tariff measures (NTMs)1 looks at regulations other than
tariffs that have an impact on international trade.
With increased international integration in the context of lower tariffs and less
stringent quotas, trade is becoming a major potential vector of external effects.
Imports can carry invasive species, such as pathogens, pests, or weeds, foreign to an
economy’s ecology. Furthermore, different trade partners may have different food
safety standards and institutional capacity to enforce them. This may lead to
imports of agri-food products that do not meet domestic requirements. Imperfect
and incomplete monitoring of imports at the border compounds the health or
environmental risk (Gossner et al., 2009). In countries with ill-deﬁned property
rights, trade may also encourage unsustainable production of some goods for the
export market, leading to concerns about the stewardship of global-commons
(Chichilnisky, 1994). Governments invoke these issues to apply a wide array of
NTMs to address real and perceived domestic concerns.
In a few instances, trade is the direct conduit of signiﬁcant external effects and it
may be an option to directly restrict trade. But often alternative policies tend to be
more effective at addressing external effects than blunt trade barriers. Assessing the
economic effects of NTMs poses signiﬁcant challenges as the link between trade,
welfare, and policy is tenuous. ManyNTMsmay restrict trade but can improve wel-
fare in the presence of negative externalities or informational asymmetries. Other
measures can expand trade as they enhance demand for a good through better
information about the good or by enhancing the good’s characteristics (Maertens
et al., 2007; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009).
The efﬁciency costs of NTMs are hence much less evident than the welfare losses
associated with tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions. They do not necessarily
embody the economic inefﬁciencies that are associated with classical trade barriers,
1 ‘NTMs are policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs, that can potentially have an
economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or both’ (MAST,
2008). This deﬁnition is too broad to be informative. Here, we further narrow down the deﬁnition focusing
on the group of measures that indirectly affect price and/or quantity by altering attributes of the goods
being sold and their perception by consumers, typically through regulatory measures. We focus onMAST’s
categories A (technical barriers to trade), B (sanitary and phytosanitary measures), and C (other technical
measures).
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unless they discriminate between sources of supply; they may, or may not, be the
least trade-restrictive policies available to correct market imperfections, and
the least trade restrictive policies may fail to maximize welfare, inclusive of the
externality. It is therefore not clear a priori that the trade impacts of the concerned
regulations are informative on allocative efﬁciency, or that removal of associated
NTMs that affect trade would achieve efﬁciency gains relative to the welfare level
under existing regulations.
Beyond the type of instrument, the level of intervention is also important in the
design of NTMs, such as an optimum maximum residue level or the level of
stringency of border inspections. In the presence of disease risks, well-designed
NTMs may allow for some limited amount of trade, while in the absence of
measures, such as strict border inspections or restricting imports to products from a
speciﬁc country or region within a country, no trade will take place at all (Paarlberg
and Lee, 1998; Wilson and Anton, 2006; Pendell et al., 2007, among others). These
features of NTMs and market imperfections are not well recognized in much of
the existing literature, which tends to have a narrow mercantilist focus on foregone
trade and trade costs (e.g., Kee et al., 2009). These trade effects have been exten-
sively analyzed with the gravity-equation approach. Many gravity analyses tend
to be broad in scope (multi commodity/sector, countries, and policies), which
allows for a broad-brush investigation of general hypotheses, such as the trade-
restricting or expanding effects of NTMs or the impact of harmonization. The
gravity equation has also been used to look at speciﬁc policy issues, such as the
European Union (EU) aﬂatoxin policy (Otsuki et al., 2001; Xiong and Beghin,
forthcoming).
Beyond the well-established trade-impeding effects of many NTMs, trade-
expanding effects also have been identiﬁed, often through harmonization and
shared standards, in bilateral and other preferential trade agreements, and for some
goods and policies (Moenius, 1999, 2006; Fontagné et al., 2005; Henry de Frahan
and Vancauteren, 2006; and Disdier et al., 2008). A few studies found an absence
of trade effects from NTMs in some sectors (Fontagné et al., 2005) and for
harmonized measures (Czubala et al., 2009).
Effects of NTMs have also been studied with partial and general equilibrium
simulation models, usually by parameterizing them as tariff-equivalent in the
import demand (or export supply) functions.2 Consumer valuation of external
effects has been neglected in most of these analyses. Even the framework of
multilateral trade rules in the World Trade Organization (WTO) tends to focus on
effects on trade and producer welfare rather than on effects on consumer welfare,
a shortcoming from an economic perspective. Our paper ﬁlls that void with a
systematic approach to consumer valuation in the economic analysis of NTMs.
2 See Ferrantino (2006) and Korinek et al. (2008) for a review of quantitative approaches.
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The paper develops a uniﬁed analytical framework to assess the costs and
beneﬁts of NTMs for market stakeholders: domestic consumers, various producers
involved in the supply chain, and governments, as well as foreign suppliers, and,
wherever relevant, foreign consumers and governments. Trade effects are part of
the assessment, as NTMs have an impact on trade as a conduit of the externality,
but trade effects are not the sole focus. The analytical framework allows com-
parison of alternative ways to design measures. It discerns their trade and welfare
effects. For example, an import ban (or prohibitive standard) to keep the domestic
market free of some undesired product characteristic can be compared to allowing
trade under clear identiﬁcation of the foreign product (e.g., through labeling).
This paper mainly focuses on standard-like measures, but the analysis could be
extended to other policy instruments, including labels, (Pigouvian) taxes, quar-
antines, market authorizations, and border inspections that may be chosen to
alleviate various market failures.
An important dimension of the framework is its ability to distinguish those
consumers (or producers) that are concerned by the negative or positive externality
and the product attributes from those that are not concerned. Concerned con-
sumers put a value to avoiding (consuming) the negative (positive) product charac-
teristic. This valuation is a key variable in the cost–beneﬁt assessment of measures
that address failures affecting consumers. Estimating this value empirically is a
challenge, but recent advances in experimental economics based on laboratory
or ﬁeld contexts are promising (see Lusk and Shogren, 2007, for a survey on
valuations regarding products’ safety and quality). On the production side, the
value of avoiding a failure is directly related to the value of the production loss that
can occur if the failure remains unabated.
We illustrate the approach with an application to shrimp trade and the consumer
valuation of information pertaining to food safety characteristics related to
antibiotics in shrimps elicited in economic experiments. The cost–beneﬁt frame-
work is essentially a modular partial equilibrium model, with demand and supply
relationships, that can be calibrated to empirical data and allows the calculation of
economic welfare effects.
The welfare-based approach can be used to deﬁne optimal non-tariff trade
policies, both from a domestic and global point of view. The optimal NTM could
turn out to be different from that implied by an international standard, such as
those referred to in the WTO agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures or technical barriers to trade (TBT). In some cases, the welfare-based
NTM could recommend policy stringency exceeding or below an international
standard. The framework is also useful for sorting out least-trade restrictive inter-
ventions among NTMs considered by policy makers and the potential trade-offs
(or lack thereof) between welfare and trade. Although we focus on food safety, our
approach applies also to environmental externalities and global commons issues
and for a host of non-price policy instruments. It is possible that some of these
policy menus could be more efﬁcient than a simple standard regime described here,
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but the message remains that when market imperfections are present, the interface
between NTMs, trade, and welfare is more complex that the simple dominant
mercantilist message.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main types of market
failures and associated NTM policy instruments. Section 3 presents a modular
framework to assess the costs and beneﬁts linked to NTMs. Section 4 illustrates the
approach with an application to shrimp trade and NTMs using recent ﬁndings in
consumer valuation. Section 5 concludes.
2. Market imperfections
Many NTMs attempt to remedy external effects. Externalities occur when some
agent’s utility or production depends on the choices made by other agents, who do
not factor these external effects into their decision making. The associated costs
or beneﬁts, associated with the externality are not reﬂected in market valuations.
The external cost or beneﬁt can affect consumers or producers. NTMs can also
address the consequences of asymmetric information (one partner in a transaction
knows more than the other) or imperfect information (not all consequences can be
known). These informational problems can occur on either the consumer or pro-
ducer side. Finally, some failures are global in the sense of a global-commons
problem for a resource perceived as belonging to the (global) community and
requiring collective stewardship. There is a trans-boundary or global element in the
failure.
Some externalities can affect consumers even though the external effect is
independent from their own consumption choices. Consumers’ concern about ani-
mal welfare is an example. Consumers are concerned about production methods;
their welfare is affected regardless of their own decisions whether to consume meat
coming from animals produced under conditions they consider inappropriate.3
Asymmetric information on health, safety, or nutritional value is an imperfection
associated with the purchase or the consumption of the good by a ﬁnal consumer.
The consumer derives a beneﬁt from consuming the good but also bears a cost or
beneﬁt not exactly known to him via a health impact creating a wedge between
private and social costs of the good. Some attributes, either experience or credence
attributes, are unknown or uncertain to the consumer at the time of purchase and
may decrease (as in the case of deleterious ingredients) or increase (as in the case of
nutritional beneﬁts) the value of the good. The undervaluation of health risks, such
as outbreaks of E-coli and salmonella, and presence of chemical residues, such as
3 This case refers to the situation when damages from the externality are ‘separable’ from market
consumption decisions. The externality affects the consumer’s welfare, but not directly through her market
consumption decision. The term ‘citizen’ rather than ‘consumer’ is perhaps more appropriate in this case,
but we follow the convention used in economics and treat citizens as consumers whenever citizens are not
producers.
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melamine residues, are recent examples of such social cost. Producers can also face
asymmetric information issues in their purchase of inputs, such as animal feed,
seeds, or crop protection chemicals.
External effects also arise in production processes and have several sources
including trade, such as in the case of foot and mouth disease (FMD). The resulting
impact is a decrease in production, because of an increase in the cost of production
either by loss of efﬁciency (farm yields fall) or by trying to abate the external effects
(fungicide applications to eliminate some fungus). These occurrences may be non-
rival (a whole region is hit by a FMD outbreak) or private (a single livestock
producer hit by contamination of feed).
Global commons refer to resources perceived as belonging to the (global)
community and requiring collective stewardship. They are open access resources,
for which property rights are ill deﬁned, such as unsustainable resource use in forest
products and the depletion of ﬁsh stocks through over-ﬁshing. Consumers do not
need to consume a speciﬁc good themselves to suffer the externality. However,
consumers may derive beneﬁts from consuming products certiﬁed as respecting the
commons. Eco-labels and fair trade policies are measures providing perceived
beneﬁts to consumers with global-commons concerns.
The analytical treatment of global commons cases will often be closely related to
the treatment of externalities affecting consumers. An increasing number of trade
frictions between high-income and low-income economies is based on global
commons issues, as interest in sustainable practices expands when exporters use
environmentally unsustainable practices.
Government can also fail, often by omission to monitor and enforce regulations.
The limited institutional capacity sometimes calls for additional interventions, or
may necessitate bold policies, such as a ban on trade and wholesale eradication, to
combat highly contagious diseases (e.g., FMD). Policy responses can be more
cooperative when planned, especially in the North–South context. For example,
certiﬁcation of South exporters by importing countries in the North providing the
additional capacity missing in the exporting country (e.g., the EU assisting Latin
American meat packers to meet EU food sanitary and phytosanitary standards).
All these market imperfections can be addressed through a wide range of policies,
but this paper concentrates on those policies that have a potential impact on
international trade ﬂows, singling out NTMs.
3. Cost–beneﬁt framework: a modular approach
This section presents a simpliﬁed framework that allows the assessment of
economic effects of NTMs designed to address different types of market failures
and market imperfections mentioned above. The framework is particularly tailored
to our empirical application presented in Section 4. On the consumer side, the
approach rests on insights from modern empirical consumer economics; on the
producer side, it incorporates insights from epidemiological studies.
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The framework is modular, essentially a partial equilibrium model. New
elements with detailed side calculations can be attached or removed from the
main structure without the necessity to alter the general logic of the approach. The
theoretical framework is designed to be applied with empirical data to facilitate a
quantitative cost–beneﬁt analysis. Not each and every potential effect is discussed
here, as the framework may be easily extended in many directions to analyze
particular trade problems. One element not elaborated here, but which can be
important in practice, concerns costs related to administration, monitoring, and
enforcement.
The framework comprises ‘modules’ for calculation of costs and beneﬁts
affecting (a) domestic consumers, (b) domestic producers, (c) domestic government,
and (d) foreign producers. For simplicity, foreign consumers and governments are
not included here. In addition, the different actors in the supply chain (farmers,
processors, retailers, etc.) are collapsed into a single production stage representing
supply. These abstractions inﬂuence results in many cases, but are maintained here
to preserve clarity in exposition. Notably, we abstract from traceability and its
incidence on cost. We could add complexity, with market intermediaries assuring
traceability between suppliers and consumers. Because of a lack of space, we only
focus on market failures affecting consumers.4 The market good being analyzed
here is assumed to be homogenous and presents a speciﬁc characteristic.
We assume that, without regulation, producers offer a good with a speciﬁc char-
acteristic (an environmental or safety risk or a speciﬁc process of production) that
domestic consumers do not want. The regulation therefore protects domestic
consumers regarding the speciﬁc characteristic conveyed by products.
We focus on a regulation corresponding to a safety standard5 that fully elimi-
nates the undesired characteristic, for example a ban on some antibiotics whereby
eliminating antibiotic residues in food. For food safety, the standard is the most
likely policy instrument compared to a voluntary label signaling a higher level of
safety than the level offered by regular products (see van Tongeren et al., 2009 for a
case with a label). The model discussed below assumes that foreign and domestic
producers have different technologies for food safety, which means they are not
similarly impacted by the enforcement of a standard (for heterogeneous producers
also see Marette and Beghin, 2010). In the baseline, the domestic ﬁrms are assumed
to have implemented the standard, so that additional compliance costs fall only on
foreign ﬁrms. However, the analytical simpliﬁcation maintained here allows a
4 Production-based failures, such as animal or plant disease outbreaks, can also be conceptualized as a
negative shock on supply, inducing a shift or a pivot of the marginal cost curve (see Orden and Romano,
1996; Wilson and Anton, 2006; Peterson and Orden, 2008).
5 The term ‘standard’ is used here to denote mandatory product and process requirements imposed by
governments. The trade literature often reserves this term to private voluntary arrangements, while it uses
the term ‘regulation’ to refer to government policies. Other policies could include assisted certiﬁcation of
foreign producers, and border or in-country inspections.
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sharper focus on the implications of regulatory heterogeneity between countries,
reﬂecting differences in what is considered appropriate product characteristics. This
assumption is particularly valid for the application to shrimp trade, which is
elaborated later.
Supply side
A perfectly competitive industry with price-taking ﬁrms is assumed for both
domestic and foreign supplies. We abstract from the export or re-export from the
domestic country, implying that imports and domestic production are only pur-
chased by domestic consumers.
There are MO domestic ﬁrms and MF foreign ﬁrms. Firms’ cost functions are
assumed quadratic in output for tractability purposes. Firms choose output to
maximize proﬁts:
πsj = pqsj − fsqsj − 1/2csq2sj for j = {1, . . . ,Ms}; s = {O, F}, (1)
where cs, fs are the variable cost parameters.6 Proﬁt maximization yields individual
ﬁrm supply functions, which can be added up to yield industry supplyQ. The ﬁrms’
inverse supplies are expressed as
pSO(QO) = cOQO/MO + fO
pSF(QF) = cFQF/MF + fF.
(2)
The total inverse supply deﬁned by the sum of foreign and domestic supply is
pSO+F(QO) =
cOcFQO + fFcO + fOcF
cOMF + cFMO . (3)
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that cO>cF and fO>fF; domestic producers
incur higher marginal costs than foreign producers. This reﬂects a situation where
domestic production incurs a costly effort to eliminate the speciﬁc undesired
characteristic that some domestic consumers do not want, while foreign producers
do not eliminate the characteristic and do not have to bear these additional costs in
the baseline.7
If the safety standard is imposed, the inverse supply of foreign producers can
be represented as a multiple of the original supply: pˉSF(QF) = λ cFQF/MF + fF
( )
with λ>1. Recall that only foreign producers are impacted by the adoption or
ther-
6We could also extend the analysis with a sunk cost Ks linked to the ﬁrm’s market entry and
compliance with regulations.
7Measuring cost of regulatory compliance for ﬁrms is far from straightforward. Various methods have
been used: ﬁrm-level surveys (e.g., Wilson and Otsuki, 2004), price comparisons (Ferrantino, 2006; Yue
et al., 2006), cost accounting (e.g., Grothe et al., 2000), econometric estimations (Antle, 2000; Maskus
et al., 2005).
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einforcement of the safety standard via a variable cost increase; domestic producers
are not impacted since they already offer food products without the speciﬁc
characteristic. The shift parameter λ of the supply function can be
derived from observations of the price increase per unit relative to the baseline
scenario. The relative change in the supply curve at the equilibrium is deﬁned by
γ = [pˉSF(QF) − pSF(QF)]/pSF(QF) = λ− 1, and thus the shift parameter of the supply
function after the standard implementation is equal to λ=1+γ .
Demand side
The characterization of preferences largely follows Polinsky and Rogerson (1983).
For simpliﬁcation purposes, all consumers are concerned and they unanimously
prefer safe food. Demands are derived from quadratic preferences. Demand of
each consumer i = {1, . . .,N} in the importing country is derived from a quasi-linear
utility function that consists of the quadratic preference for the market good of
interest and an additive numéraire:
Ui(qi,wi) = aqi − bˉq2i /2− I(1− S)ri(QF/Q)qi +wi (4)
where the term aqi − bˉq2i /2 is the immediate satisfaction of consumer i from
consuming a quantity qi of the good, and wi is the numéraire good consumed
by i. This characterization leads to tractable linear demand curves. For simplicity,
a, bˉ are the same for the N consumers.8 The consumer cannot distinguish between
the two goods (foreign versus domestic).
The binary variable S indicates the safety standard policy. Under the absence of
the standard with S=0, the per-unit damage ri is linked to the foreign product
purchased by the consumer. Only a fraction (QF/Q), withQ=QF+Q0, of the good
on the market has the speciﬁc characteristic. The perceived damage associated with
the consumption of the good with the speciﬁc characteristic is denoted ri(QF/Q)qi.
The effects of information are captured by the term − Iriqi(QF/Q). The binary
parameter I represents the knowledge regarding the speciﬁc characteristic brought
by the good. If consumers are unaware of the speciﬁc characteristic or if there is an
unaccounted externality linked to the speciﬁc characteristic, then I=0. Conversely,
I=1 means that consumers are aware of the speciﬁc characteristic and internalize
the externality and reduce their consumption. Creating this awareness can be part
of food safety policy packages.
For the rest of the analysis, we consider both situations (I=0 and I=1). First with
I=0, the non-internalized damage should be accounted for in the welfare cal-
8 There is a loss of generality with this assumption. Some consumers could believe some technology is
harmful although it is not, then imposing a standard will clearly impose costs on those consumers who do
not care. Alternatively, if preferences for food safety are a function of the income distribution, then a
standard may have highly regressive effects on poorer consumers.
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culations, but does not feed back in to the demand. Second with I=1, consumers
internalize the damage and demand is reduced. When the safety standard is
implemented (S=1), the damage completely disappears, which makes both
alternative situations of consumer awareness (I=0 and I=1) equivalent.
The maximization of the utility function under a budget constraint yields
a demand function for each consumer. Aggregate demand for the good is
obtained by summing individual demand functions over all N consumers. The
associated damage per unit consumed is equal to r(QF/Q) for the N consumers.
With b = bˉ/N, the overall (inverse) demand function for all consumers is p(Q,I,
r)=a−bQ− I(1−S )r(QF/Q). The area under the demand curve and above the
market price represents the consumer welfare (‘surplus’) from consuming the good.
It is the difference between the willingness to pay (WTP) and the price paid over all
units consumed.
Parameterization of r is crucial to the empirical assessment. Surveys and
laboratory experiments providing information on consumer WTP for a good can
be used here. More precisely, r is deﬁned with the relative change in the average
consumer WTP. The value of the relative change is computed as follows:
δ=[E(WTPInfo)−E (WTPNoInfo)]/E(WTPNoInfo) by using the average WTP before
and after the revelation of information to the consumers on the speciﬁc
characteristic that the good may present. Thus, using the relative price variation
linked to the damage, internalization is equal to the inverse demand shift deﬁned by
[p(Q,1,r)−p (Q,0,r)]/p(Q,0,r)=δ, which leads to r=δ×p(Q,0,r) (see Marette et al.,
2008 for details). Under the absence of the standard (S=0), this value is internalized
in the demand when consumers are aware (I=1) or used for the calculation of the
cost of ignorance when consumers are unaware (I=0).
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is ﬁrst presented for the situation where consumers are unaware of the
damage when no regulation is implemented. Figure 1 shows domestic demand (D),
foreign supply (SF), and total supply (SO+SF) (the domestic supply SO is omitted for
clarity). The price, p, is located on the vertical axis and the quantity, Q, is shown
along the horizontal axis.
Free trade without regulation leads to an equilibrium E. The equilibrium price pE
clears the market by equalizing demand and supply with an overall equilibrium
quantity QE. QF
E is foreign output and QE−QFE is domestic output. The proﬁts
correspond to area OxvpE for foreign producers and area xvEz for domestic
producers. The surplus of domestic consumers corresponds to area pEaE. The
foreign products with the characteristic leading to the damage do not inﬂuence the
demand since I=0. The corresponding cost of ignorance, initially deﬁned by riQ
(QF/Q)= riQF in (4) for domestic consumers, is accounted for in the welfare
calculations. It is equal to rQF
E represented by the area 0(− r)tQFE. The cost of
ignorance takes into account the non-internalized per-unit damage times the
quantity sold by foreign producers. Domestic welfare is the sum of domestic
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producers’ proﬁts and consumer surplus minus the cost of ignorance. International
welfare is the sum of domestic welfare and foreign producers’ proﬁts.9
When a safety standard is adopted or enforced on foreign suppliers, the
market allocation is modiﬁed as represented in ﬁgure 1 with the bold curves SF,
SD + SF and the equilibrium point H. Assuming that the stringent regulation
increases cost of production for the foreign producers only, supply is reduced
relative to the initial equilibrium point v in Figure 1. In other words, from the initial
equilibrium quantity, the overall marginal costs increase by γpE for foreign
producers. The supply shifts increases the equilibrium price to pH, which reduces
consumer surplus: pHaH<pEaE. For domestic consumers, the initial damage
(represented by the area 0(− r)tQFE)) fully disappears once the standard is
enforced.10 The overall effect of a stricter standard is ambiguous for consumers
since it depends on the comparison between the surplus reduction linked to the
Figure 1. Impact of a standard with unaware consumers (I=0)
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9 Full analytical expressions for equilibrium values as well as for all the components of welfare are
available as supplementary material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1474745612000201.
10 Alternatively, the stringency of a standard could be set along a continuum, which would lead to a
gradual diminution of the cost of ignorance. The standard could then be set optimally at the margin, where
the beneﬁt of reducing ignorance will be equal to the costs of meeting the standard. This would yield a
socially optimal standard, but the optimal result disappears if the standard leads to sunk costs of
compliance, errors by the regulators, and discontinuity in the technology.
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price and full disappearance of the damage. The effect is also ambiguous for foreign
producers since their production decreases for any given price, while the equili-
brium price increases. The domestic producers have a higher proﬁt wcHu>xvEz,
since their supply curve did not change, while the price is higher. The overall
comparison for different agents will be elicited in the next section, which introduces
a simple application based on the mechanism depicted in Figure 1.
We now turn to the case where consumers are (or become) aware of the damage
and internalize it. In this case, the baseline scenario (without standard) changes
from the initial equilibrium E in Figure 1 to initial equilibrium K in Figure 2 as
demand shifts in with equilibrium (Pk, Qk). Internalizing the damage decreases
demand and reduces proﬁts (fewer units sold at a lower price). However, the cost of
ignorance disappears as consumers internalize the damage because they are aware
of the externality. The equilibrium price pK internalizes the damage in the demand.
With a standard, demand could be enhanced as consumers would value the
increased average quality. The enforcement of the standard leads to the new higher
equilibriumH in Figure 2. There are several welfare impacts. Foreign producers can
gain from the standard as the equilibrium price increases when the equilibrium
shifts from K to H. With aware consumers in the importing country, it may be in
the interest of foreign suppliers to have stricter standards enforced. The increase in
their costs (from SF to SˉF) could be fully offset by the higher price received (from PK
to PH). In addition, they are likely to sell fewer units which would have a negative
impact on proﬁts. Domestic suppliers gain as they receive a higher price and are
likely to sell more units because demand is stronger and their cost structure has not
changed (same SO) and foreign suppliers now have a higher unit cost.
Figure 2. Impact of a standard with aware consumers (I=1)
p
Q
D
O FS S
a
0
Ep E
EQ
O FS SH
HQ
K K
FrQ
c
FSFS
K
FQu z
Hp
xw
K
F
K
Q
a – r Q
K
KQ
Kp
+
+
Q
Welfare costs and beneﬁts of non-tariff measures in trade 367
4. Application with shrimp quality and trade frictions
In this illustration, we simulate the impact of a safety standard eliminating the use
of antibiotics in shrimp aquaculture, a widespread problem in many operations.
First, some antibiotics used for shrimp production can be toxic (e.g., chloramphe-
nicol) and could cause genetic damages and possibly lead to cancer. This fact
directly affects consumers as framed in our previous model. It is recognized by the
FAO/WHO/WTO/Codex Alimentarius committee determining drug standards
under the SPS agreements (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,
2002). Second, intense use of antibiotics leads to antibiotic resistance by some
micro-organisms with important consequences for animal and human health
(World Health Organization, 2011). This externality is not directly taken into
account in the previous model.
Production and trade of shrimp products have seen a signiﬁcant rise over the last
decade globally, and with dominant trade ﬂows from emerging developing
countries to OECD countries, especially the EU and the United States (Roheim,
2004; Disdier and Marette, 2010 and 2012). However, this expansion occurred at
some health costs because the quality of seafood imports has been variable. The
sanitary quality of seafood production in some developing countries has been
subpart through the use of additive substances. To prevent and treat bacterial
infections and other pathogens, shrimp producers use a range of pesticides, harmful
drugs and antibiotics, which are toxic to human health. Wemeasure the impact of a
hypothetical new stringent standard that could be adopted by the EU, aimed at
eliminating all antibiotic residues in shrimps.11 Testing technology has also evolved
and the ability to detect ever smaller residues has been improved (Debaere, 2010).
Note that the use of these antibiotics has already been banned inside the EU for
many years. Therefore, and consistent with the assumptions in our presented
framework, the standard adopted by the EU only affects non-European producers.
With the initial situation preceding an enforcement of the regulation on foreign
suppliers, parameters of the model are calibrated in such a way as to replicate
market prices and quantities for the year 2006 in the EU-15 (corresponding to
the equilibrium E in Figures 1 and 2) and with consumers assumed to be unaware
of the health risk. With the baseline scenario before the enforcement of the
standard, it is assumed that only foreign products use antibiotics. With
the observed quantity QˆE sold over a period, the average price pˆE observed over
the period, and the direct price elasticity εˆ obtained from econometric estimates, the
calibration leads to estimated values equal to 1/b˜ = −εˆQˆE/pˆE, a˜ = b˜QˆE + pˆE for a
demand Q=(a−p)/b; the same method can be used for the supply side. Table 1
11 Such a standard could follow the example of the organic shrimp production process developed by
Madagascar (Hervieu, 2009).
368 J O H N B E G H I N E T A L .
details the parameters used for calibrating the baseline scenario with I=0, namely
when consumers are not aware of the antibiotics problem.
The value of the per-unit damage associated with foreign shrimp, r, deﬁned in
Figure 1, is determined by using results from a consumer choice experiment. This
experiment was conducted in Paris, France, in multiple one-hour sessions in
December 2009. The sample included 160 participants randomly selected by phone
based on the quota method and was representative for age groups and socio-
economic status for the population of Paris.
A multiple price list was used for eliciting consumers’ WTP (willingness to pay)
for a 100 g plastic package of farmed, midsize, shelled, cooked, and refrigerated
shrimps. Cooked and refrigerated shrimps are the most common form of shrimp
consumption in France. Participants were asked to choose whether or not they
would buy the product for prices varying from E0.25 to E4 (US$5) with a 25 cent
interval between possible choices (Disdier and Marette, 2012). Here, we use two of
the WTPs elicited during this experiment: a ﬁrst one before the revelation of any
information and a second one after the revelation of information on food safety for
shrimps produced in non-European countries. These two WTP estimates allow
measuring the marginal impact of information.
Information about the WTP for increased food safety was revealed through
responses to the following message: ‘Many bacteriological infections affect shrimp
breeding pools. Bad production conditions (bad water quality for example) favor
the growth of bacteria. To ﬁght against these bacteria, shrimp producers in some
developing countries use antibiotics and other chemical products that are toxic to
human health and therefore forbidden in almost all countries. Given the difﬁculties
and the cost of inspection of products, it is likely that some shrimps sold in France
were treated with these antibiotics and chemical products toxic to human health.’
Table 1. Values of parameters for the calibrated model of shrimps in 2006
Variable EU-15
Domestic production sold on the domestic market (tons) 49,970
Imports sold on the domestic market (tons) 473,196
Consumption in 2006 (tons) 523,166
Price per kg in 2006 (US$)a 6.29
Own-price elasticity of demandb –0.67
Own-price elasticity of supply (domestic and foreign)c 0.97
Notes: Quantities and prices for 2006 come from United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(2009).
a The domestic price was estimated by dividing the average value of imports by the quantity of imports
and exports in the EU (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009).
b Asche and Bjørndal (2001) for crustaceans in the EU.
c Dey et al. (2004) for the aquaculture of shrimps by taking the average of own-price elasticities of supply
over the top ﬁve world producers of shrimps in Table 3 (p. 5).
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The average WTP expressed by participants in the experiment, before the
information revelation, is equal to E2.14 for tropical (foreign) shrimp, while the
average WTP after the revelation is equal to E1.13. The relative variation in the
WTP is therefore equal to (1.13–2.14)/2.14=–0.47. In other words, consumers are
willing to pay only about half the original price once they learn about the potential
health risk problem associated with shrimp consumption. Using the initial price pE
the per-unit damage is equal to r=0.47×pE . With this value, the cost of ignorance
is riQF
E when I=0 (see Figure 1) and the internalized per-unit damage is riQF
K/QK
when I=1 (see Figure 2).
Eventually, the enforcement of the safety standard would lead shrimp exporters
to the EU to avoid antibiotics. The impact of avoiding antibiotics on the supply is
determined as follows. Based on an analysis of organic shrimps in Madagascar,
Hervieu (2009) notes that the switch from non-organic to organic, antibiotic-free
shrimps increases the variable cost of production (farm price) from 5E/kg to 8E/kg.
We use this change in variable unit cost to estimate the shift of the supply function
by setting γ=(8–5)/5=0.6 and is applied to the foreign supply curves presented in
Figures 1 and 2. Recall from Figures 1 and 2 that only foreign products lead to the
damage for consumers and only foreign producers are impacted by the safety
standard getting rid of the damage.
Table 2 presents the impact of the assumed enforcement of the food safety
standard using a variety of economic indicators. The ﬁrst column corresponds to
the market adjustment when consumers are unaware of the damage under the
absence of the standard as in Figure 1. The second column corresponds to the
market adjustment when consumers are aware of the damage (I=1) that would
occur if the standard were absent (Figure 1).
Table 2. Welfare changes for the year 2006 linked to the safety standard enforced
at the border
EU – 15
Unaware
consumers (I=0)
Aware Consumers
(I=1)
Change in quantity consumed (1000 tons) –88.0 (–16.8%) 0.166 (0.03%)
Change in imports (1000 tons) –100.1 (–21.1%) – 20.4 (–5.1%)
Price change (US$ per kg) 1.57 (25%) 2.67 (51%)
Change in domestic consumers surplus
(without the cost of ignorance) (million US$)
– 756.4 (–71.5%) 1.3 (0.07%)
Change in cost of ignorance with unaware
consumers only (I=0)1 (million US$)
1398.9 (+100%)
Change in domestic producers proﬁts (million US$) 88.5 (54%) 138.5 (123.6%)
Change in domestic welfare (million US$) 731.0 (59%) 139.8 (7.7%)
Change in foreign exporters proﬁts (million US$) – 8.4 (–0.5%) 464.9 (43.8%)
Change in international welfare (million US$) 722.6 (26.2%) 604.6 (21%)
Notes: Relative changes (%) compared to the baseline scenario in parentheses.
1 The value is positive since the cost of ignorance disappears leading to a beneﬁt for consumers.
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The results of Table 2 show that, when the standard is implemented, foreign
producers decrease their output and domestic producers increase their output (by
taking the difference between the ﬁrst line and the second line for each column),
since domestic producers enjoy a better price without suffering the cost increase.
Domestic consumers and domestic producers would beneﬁt from a standard
eliminating dangerous antibiotics. The change in consumers’ surplus (including the
cost of ignorance when I=0) is higher when consumers are initially unaware of the
damage than when they are aware of the damage, since the cost of ignorance is
eliminated by the safety standard with unaware consumers. The change in
consumers’ surplus is relatively low with aware consumers since the positive effect
linked to the disappearance of the internalized damage is partially offset by the
negative effect linked to the price increase.
Foreign producers suffer from the standard only with unaware consumers (I=0)
as described in Figure 1. This loss is relatively low in absolute value compared to
the gain for domestic producers, since the cost increase for foreign producers is
partially outweighed by the beneﬁt of a higher price. Conversely, foreign producers
beneﬁt from the standard if consumers are fully aware of the antibiotics problem
and of the solution in the form of a strict enforcement of the production standard at
the border (I=1); in this case, the increase in consumer demand leads to higher
prices and proﬁts even for foreign producers. With I=0, international welfare
increases, but there are pronounced distribution effects as foreign producers lose
proﬁts. With I=1, the safety standard beneﬁts all foreign and domestic agents. For
both cases (I=0 and I=1), the international welfare linked to the regulation
increases, while the imports decrease (see the second line of Table 2). It means that
considering only trade volumes or values can be insufﬁcient for characterizing a
NTM.
This application shows that the enforcement of a food safety standard can be
socially preferable to the status-quo situation, both domestically and internation-
ally. The size of the estimated damage that is avoided by enforcing stricter
standards at the border is obviously crucial to this result. A second driver is the
estimated cost of switching to alternative production methods, in this case
antibiotic-free shrimp production. Alternatives must be available, and the
additional cost must be low enough to provide incentives to foreign suppliers to
switch production methods. Finally, the most beneﬁcial policy package combines
enforcement of the standard at the border with generating consumer awareness of
the food safety issue.
It should be kept in mind, though, that the numerical magnitudes of the
estimated welfare effects presented here depend crucially on the underlying
functional forms (linear demand and supply functions) and on the quality of data
and parameters.
Many extensions to our illustration can be considered. For instance, an export
demand for the EU could be estimated and considered since the EU is a relatively
large actor. Gravity results linked to the previous regulation enforcement could be
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also considered for calibrating changes in trade coming from the related regulation
(Disdier and Marette, 2010). A scenario with a label signaling the country of origin
and a high level of safety could be studied (Bureau et al., 1998).
Non-prohibitive standards where both domestic and foreign ﬁrms make costly
efforts to comply and consumers are to some extent able to identify the degree of
compliance can easily be accommodated. Other extensions include entry and exit
of ﬁrms in the face of ﬁxed (through additional investments) and variable (through
additional activities) compliance costs. If compliance with standards and
regulations implies large investments that are sunk once undertaken, economies
of scale become an important characteristic of the industry structure (Rau and van
Tongeren, 2007, 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Sunk investments do not
ﬁgure in the ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions and have more indirect effects on
market prices through entry and exit of ﬁrms. Only ﬁrms that are sufﬁciently
productive to ‘jump the hurdle’ of ﬁxed market entry costs will be able to export.
5. Concluding remarks
Efﬁciency implications of NTMs are much less evident than the welfare losses
associated with tariffs and quota. NTMs do not necessarily embody the economic
inefﬁciencies that are associated with classical trade barriers, unless they
discriminate between sources of supply. It is therefore not clear a priori that the
trade impacts of regulations are inefﬁcient, or that removal of associated NTMs
that affect trade would achieve efﬁciency gains that would exceed the losses from
weaker regulation.
The increasing prevalence of NTMs is a permanent reality conditioning trade in
agri-food. A systematic assessment of their effects, across countries and products, is
much warranted, in particular in view of the rising occurrence of trade frictions
about food safety and food quality (Josling et al., 2004; Disdier and van Tongeren,
2010).
This paper contributes to a systematic analysis of economic costs and beneﬁts of
NTMs, focusing on the often neglected aspect of consumer beneﬁts from
regulations that aim at addressing market failures in the food sector. The proposed
methodology is operational for comparing alternative policy choices, such as
standards, border inspection policies, and labeling in an international context. The
methodology contributes to a more comprehensive welfare analysis of NTMs than
that offered by looking at trade effects alone.
The illustrative application to shrimp trade in the face of EU regulations aiming
at eliminating consumption of shrimps that contain antibiotics shows that
enforcement of such a production standard can be welfare enhancing, both
domestically and internationally. The beneﬁts are more widely shared between
domestic and foreign players if domestic consumers are made fully aware of the
particular health problems and the solutions in the form of a strictly imposed
production standard. The clear policy message is that a well-designed policy
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package combines enforcement of the standard at the border with generating
consumer awareness of the food safety issue.
The proposed comparative approach to NTMs allows for the identiﬁcation of
alternative ways to address a given regulatory problem. By systematically
enumerating the costs and beneﬁts for all the different economic actors involved,
an evidence-based approach can be followed that yields a solid basis for mutual
exchange and identiﬁcation of least-cost solutions.
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